Armed factions affiliated with Al-Qaeda and Tuareg separatist rebels launched a massive, coordinated offensive across Mali on Sunday, April 25. The attack struck the country simultaneously in the capital Bamako, the garrison town of Kati, and the northern and central cities of Kidal, Gao, Mopti, and Sevare. Security analysts described it as the largest coordinated attack on Mali in years.

Two distinct armed coalitions executed the operation in concert. The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, known by its French acronym JNIM and affiliated with Al-Qaeda, claimed strikes on Kati, Bamako’s international airport, and the central regions. The Azawad Liberation Front, a Tuareg-led separatist coalition, simultaneously seized the strategic northern city of Kidal and struck military sites in Gao. JNIM formally acknowledged coordination with the Azawad Liberation Front in its post-operation statement.

The nationwide assaults represent the most severe security breach for Mali’s military junta since it assumed power following back-to-back coups in 2020 and 2021. Ulf Laessing, head of the Sahel program at the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation, described the operation as the largest coordinated attack in years.

In Bamako, heavily armed attackers targeted the international airport, forcing an immediate closure and the diversion or cancellation of all commercial flights. Witnesses attempting to reach the airport described navigating through active combat zones characterized by heavy gunfire and military helicopter activity. Sky News Arabia described the breach of the capital region as a “security earthquake.”

Aerial view of Bamako, Mali, April 25, 2026, the day of the coordinated offensive. Photo: AP.

The assault simultaneously struck Kati, located just north of Bamako. Kati hosts the primary military barracks and serves as the residence of junta leader Assimi Goita. Eyewitnesses reported massive explosions and continuous gunfire near the main military base, and the residence of Malian Defence Minister Sadio Camara was destroyed during the incursion. The United States Embassy and British Foreign Office both issued urgent security advisories instructing nationals to remain indoors.

The Malian army issued a statement claiming it had repelled the attacks on multiple sites and killed hundreds of attackers. A large-scale sweep operation was declared across the capital and surrounding areas. The army’s casualty claims for enemy killed have not been independently verified.

As combat raged in the capital, a second front swept across central and northern Mali. The Azawad Liberation Front seized control of Kidal, a historic Tuareg stronghold in the northeast. Rebel spokesperson Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane announced via social media that forces had also taken several military sites in the northeastern city of Gao and captured a central military camp in Kidal.

Aerial view of Gao, northern Mali. Gunfire and explosions rocked the city on April 25, 2026, as JNIM and Azawad forces struck simultaneously. Photo: AFP.

Heni Nsaibia, a senior West Africa analyst at the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), noted that the choice of targets was striking. The recapture of Kidal by state forces in 2023 had been the cornerstone of the government’s entire narrative of territorial reconquest. Losing it again represents a devastating strategic reversal. In Gao, a major military hub, residents reported powerful explosions and intense exchanges of fire throughout the afternoon before a regional curfew brought a cautious calm by evening.

Hasret Kargin, a researcher on African affairs at Mentel World Research, assessed that the military’s chances of recovering northern cities like Kidal and Gao without significant air support are very slim. Russian-affiliated Africa Corps sites remained under intense pressure across multiple cities throughout the engagement.

The operational convergence between JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front has surprised some observers, but analysts with deep knowledge of the Sahel regard it as structurally predictable. The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), in its comprehensive mapping of Sahelian armed groups, explicitly notes that lines between jihadist and non-jihadist armed groups are often unclear. Fighters routinely pass between organizations based on geography and local circumstances, creating fertile ground for tactical cooperation against shared adversaries.

JNIM was established in March 2017 as an umbrella coalition under Tuareg militant Iyad Ag Ghali, unifying Ansar al-Din, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Mourabitoun, and Katibat Macina. Katibat Macina, led by Amadou Kouffa, has a deeply entrenched presence in central Mali’s Mopti region, explaining the rapid strikes on Mopti and Sevare. Al-Mourabitoun, another key JNIM faction, specializes in complex attacks on military and soft targets deep within state-controlled territory, a pattern evident in the Kati and airport strikes.

Areas where Al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated jihadist groups operate across Mali and neighbouring countries, with attack locations from ACLED data. Photo: AFP / ACLED infographic.

The Azawad Liberation Front’s seizure of Kidal builds on decades of Tuareg insurgency. The ECFR traces the Azawad movement through earlier formations including the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA). The HCUA operates with a strong presence in Kidal and maintains close historical and leadership ties to Ansar al-Din, the founding faction of JNIM. This deep institutional overlap provides the structural framework for joint operations in Gao, where JNIM explicitly acknowledged coordinating with the Azawad Liberation Front.

Following the 2020 and 2021 coups, Goita’s junta severed ties with France and the broader West, contracting the Russian Wagner Group in 2021 to fill the resulting security vacuum. In June 2025, the Wagner deployment was formally replaced by the Africa Corps, operating directly under the Russian Ministry of Defense. Saturday’s offensive has severely tested the viability of this outsourced security model.

Amr El-Deeb, Director of the International Geopolitical Operations Center in Moscow, stated that the ability of the Azawad movement and JNIM to coordinate and penetrate strategic fortifications like the Kati base demonstrates the complete failure of recent military policies. El-Deeb further warned that if the junta collapses, it would serve as a severe blow to Russia, which uses Mali as a primary showcase for its post-French model in Africa.

Malian soldiers arrive in Kidal after a patrol from Gao in 2013. Azawad rebels claim to have retaken the city from Malian army and Russian forces on April 25, 2026. The claim cannot be independently verified. Photo: AFP.

The April 25 offensive represents the culmination of a long-term attrition strategy orchestrated primarily by JNIM. The formal withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA at the end of 2023 created a massive security vacuum that armed actors exploited to reorganize and launch counter-offensives. El-Deeb noted that while Malian and Russian forces attempted to secure strategic sites, jihadist and separatist groups used ungoverned spaces to rebuild capability and plan coordinated action.

JNIM’s approach has increasingly integrated economic warfare. In late 2025, the Al-Qaeda affiliate declared a blockade on fuel imports, systematically attacking military-guarded fuel tankers in southern and western Mali. As Ruvinetti observed, JNIM’s strategy is now as economic and political as it is military, seeking to isolate Bamako, disrupt supply lines, exhaust the army, and demonstrate the junta’s inability to govern.

Despite the deteriorating security landscape, the junta has entrenched its political position. In July 2025, Goita was granted a five-year renewable presidential mandate without elections, bypassing earlier pledges to transition to civilian rule. The Trump administration has recently sought to establish contact with Sahelian military councils, and Togo has attempted regional mediation, but the trajectory remains highly volatile. El-Deeb warned that a collapse of Malian security infrastructure could propel a surge of transnational jihad into neighbouring states including Burkina Faso, Niger, Ghana, and Togo.