Iran’s army spokesperson, Brigadier General Mohammad Akraminia, declared on 13 May 2026 that American weapons will no longer be permitted to transit the Strait of Hormuz toward regional military bases. The announcement was made at a ceremony in Tehran marking the 40th day since the burial of former Armed Forces Chief of Staff Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi, and it placed the Iran-U.S. weapons transit ban at grid reference 40R DQ 26997 38686 (26.567°N, 56.267°E), the narrowest and most operationally critical point in the strait. Akraminia framed the declaration not as a temporary restriction but as a formal element of Iran’s new management posture over the waterway.

The general stated that any nation wishing to move vessels through the strait must do so under the supervision of Iran’s armed forces and without causing harm. That phrase echoed the language Tehran has been using since late April when it established the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, a new regulatory body requiring ships to file detailed declarations before passage. The 13 May statement goes further: it explicitly extends that supervisory role into blocking the logistical resupply of American military outposts in the Gulf region.

Akraminia also announced a shift in declared military doctrine. Iran’s approach is now described as offensive rather than defensive in nature, and he warned that any mistake by an adversary would trigger what he called the most severe possible response. That formulation is consistent with recent statements from other Iranian commanders indicating that the period of purely reactive posturing has ended.

The Bandar Abbas naval complex, at grid reference 40R DR 27392 06916 (27.183°N, 56.267°E), sits directly north of the narrowest choke point and serves as the operational hub for what Iran now describes as a jointly administered waterway. According to Akraminia, the western sector of the Strait falls under the Revolutionary Guard’s navy, while the eastern sector is controlled by the Iranian regular army’s navy. This division formalises a coordinated command arrangement that has been building since February.

Prior to the conflict, a 2007 reorganisation had assigned the IRGC Navy sole responsibility for the Persian Gulf, with the regular navy covering waters beyond it, and both forces sharing the strait. What has changed since February 2026 is the unification of purpose: both branches now treat the strait as Iranian sovereign space to be actively managed, not simply patrolled. According to the Congressional Research Service, Iran possesses the means to disrupt shipping through mines, fast boats, shore-based cruise missiles, submarines, and drones, giving the joint command substantial coercive leverage.

Shipping data reported by Lloyd’s List indicates that only around 40 vessels crossed the strait in the entire week ending 3 May 2026, compared with a pre-war average of approximately 120 crossings per day. Iran has formalised transit requirements through its new Persian Gulf Strait Authority, which demands ship declarations covering ownership, nationality, cargo, and crew. Reports indicate Iran has been charging fees of up to million per vessel, and the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control has warned that such payments could constitute sanctions violations.

Running alongside the political declarations, Iranian forces have been conducting a military maneuver officially named “Confronting the Enemy on Any Land.” Akraminia used the occasion to claim that an enemy plan to shock the nation through assassinating senior military commanders and toppling the system within three days had failed entirely. The assertion is framed in the context of the February 2026 U.S.-Israeli strikes, which resulted in the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Akraminia described the population as having responded not with a coup, but with a rallying movement behind the state and its successor leadership.

The drill appears designed to project offensive readiness at a moment when ceasefire negotiations remain stalled. Iran sent its response to the latest U.S. proposal via Pakistani mediators on around 10 May, but President Trump rejected it publicly as “TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE.” Iranian state television described the U.S. offer as amounting to surrender, with Tehran demanding war reparations, full sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, an end to sanctions, and the release of seized Iranian assets. Neither side has removed its respective blockade.

In a separate address on 13 May, delivered in Amol in Mazandaran Province at grid reference 39S XA 21040 36817 (36.469°N, 52.351°E), IRGC Navy Cultural and Psychological Operations Deputy Saeed Siahsorani issued a direct threat to the United States and to President Trump personally. Siahsorani stated that if America and Trump chose to act, Iran would turn the Persian Gulf into the largest blue graveyard of American marines. He described the Strait of Hormuz as having become, in his words, the Strait of the Honor of Islam.

Siahsorani also characterised the current situation as “smart blocking” rather than full-scale naval warfare, while acknowledging that asymmetric operations against adversaries were ongoing. The formulation suggests Tehran is deliberately holding space between ceasefire posture and active hostility, using the language of deterrence while maintaining operational pressure on shipping.

Brigadier General Seyed Hassan Mortazavi, commander of the IRGC Quds Headquarters covering Sistan-Baluchestan and Kerman provinces, spoke at a ceremony distributing dowries for brides in Zahedan at grid reference 41R KN 92735 64844 (29.496°N, 60.862°E). The Quds Headquarters commands all IRGC conventional units and internal security operations in Iran’s restive southeast, a region that borders both Pakistan and Afghanistan and has historically been the site of insurgent activity. Mortazavi’s presence at a civilian welfare ceremony was itself a message of normalcy.

Mortazavi claimed that enemies who once considered themselves global superpowers now bow in submission to the greatness and independence of the Islamic Republic. He pointed to public gatherings across Iran and in Islamic countries as evidence of popular support, pushing back against a narrative that citizens have turned away from the regime. Addressing critics who argued that the population was distancing itself from the system, he described the public presence as “vast and heroic,” extending beyond Iran’s borders into Western nations in support of the Islamic Republic.

The Quds Headquarters has been designated by the EU as part of a broader IRGC proscription enacted in January 2026. Mortazavi’s appointment to the command dates to January 2023, and his operational zone gives him responsibility for one of the most strategically sensitive corridors in Iran. The ceremony format, blending civic welfare with political-military messaging, is consistent with the IRGC’s documented pattern of using social programs to build influence in peripheral provinces.

The ceasefire agreed on 8 April 2026 through Pakistani mediation has not produced a re-opening of the Strait. Iran has described the U.S. counter-blockade of Iranian ports, in place since 13 April, as a potential prelude to a ceasefire violation. The U.S. Navy has turned back 61 commercial vessels and disabled four since imposing that blockade, and has struck at least two Iranian oil tankers it said were attempting to breach the cordon. Iran in turn has attacked shipping in and around the strait, with the French vessel CMA CGM San Antonio among the latest to report damage.

The UK Parliament Library notes that Iran’s negotiating position now includes full sovereignty over the Strait, war reparations from the United States, an end to sanctions, and the release of frozen Iranian assets. The United States has sought a comprehensive deal covering freedom of navigation and a rollback of Iran’s nuclear programme. Those positions remain far apart. Meanwhile, Iran has been formalising its control infrastructure, including the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, navigation route maps, and a new legal framework it describes as replacing the pre-war international norms.

Iranian military doctrine, as articulated by Akraminia on 13 May, has now been officially framed as offensive. That declaration carries operational meaning: it signals that Tehran no longer views military action as a response-only posture, and that the bar for initiating or escalating force has been redefined internally. The Siahsorani speech from Amol reinforced that framing, asserting that “smart blocking” is already underway and that asymmetric warfare continues. The combination of arms transit denial, joint naval command formalisation, and offensive doctrine language represents a significant escalation in the rhetorical and legal architecture around the strait.