Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service published its statement on 19 May 2026, naming five Latvian military installations: Adazi at grid reference 34VCH 7120 8320 (57.0700°N, 24.3500°E), Selija (also transliterated Celia), Lielvarde at 34VCH 8140 7720 (56.7300°N, 24.9700°E), Daugavpils at 35VLC 0460 5810 (55.8800°N, 26.5200°E), and Jekabpils. The agency claimed personnel from Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces have already arrived at these bases and are preparing to launch drone strikes against Russian territory.

The stated operational rationale is straightforward: launching from Latvian territory rather than from inside Ukraine would significantly reduce flight time to targets in northwestern Russia, particularly in Leningrad Oblast and around St Petersburg. Russian territory in that direction lies roughly 200 to 300 kilometres from the Latvian border at its nearest points, compared with 600 to 900 kilometres from central Ukraine.

The SVR statement includes a passage describing how Ukraine persuaded Latvian leadership to agree to the operation by falsely claiming the exact launch point of any drone would be undetectable. The agency then asserts that modern reconnaissance tools can in fact identify a UAV’s origin point with high accuracy and that analysis of drone wreckage can confirm the launch location. It invokes a December 2025 alleged Ukrainian drone attempt against Putin’s residence as precedent. It closes with the warning that the coordinates of Latvian decision-making centres are known to Russia, and that NATO membership will not protect “the accomplices of terrorists” from retaliation.

Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braze responded on X within hours of the SVR statement’s publication. Her post was unambiguous: “Russia lies again. This time it is SVR or the External Intelligence Service running a disinformation campaign against Latvia. FACT: Latvia does NOT provide airspace for attacks on Russia. That has been explained several times to Russian representatives.” Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics separately posted that Russia was lying about Latvia allowing its airspace or territory to be used for strikes against Russia or any other country.

The Latvian position is consistent with formal joint statements. On 10 April 2026, the defence ministries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania issued a joint rejection of Russian claims that the Baltic states had provided air corridors to Ukrainian UAVs. The three countries have also called on NATO to strengthen Baltic air defence and have lodged diplomatic protests with Russia over the drone incidents that have been crossing their territory.

The SVR campaign is not new in its form. Russia’s information operations around the Baltic airspace issue have followed a consistent pattern: a real-world incident (a Ukrainian drone straying into NATO territory due to Russian jamming) is used to establish a factual foundation, then a maximalist interpretation is layered over it (the country is deliberately allowing this, it is complicit, it is a legitimate target). The cycle accelerated sharply after the 7 May drone incident at the Latvian fuel storage facility and the subsequent political collapse in Riga.

At approximately 12:00 local time on 19 May 2026, a Romanian Air Force F-16 from the Carpathian Vipers detachment, stationed at Siauliai Air Base in Lithuania under NATO’s Baltic Air Policing 71 rotation, intercepted and destroyed a suspected Ukrainian drone over southern Estonia near Pohltsamaa at approximate grid reference 34VCJ 9350 6230 (58.6500°N, 25.8000°E). Wreckage fell into a marshy area near Kablaküla in Pohltsamaa municipality. No injuries or civilian damage were reported.

Estonian Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur stated that the drone had been detected before it entered Estonian airspace, tracked first by Latvian defence and then by Estonia’s own radar systems. The alert was issued across six Estonian counties: Tartu, Joegeva, Viljandi, Valga, Voeru, and Poelva. The all-clear came at 12:55 local time. Lithuania’s defence ministry simultaneously activated cell-broadcast warnings in four Latvian municipalities (Preili, Rezekne, Ludza, Kraslava) as the track crossed from one country to the other. Portuguese F-16s are based at Amari in Estonia under the current rotation, but the Romanian jets operating from Siauliai were closer and responded instead.

Pevkur said the drone’s trajectory indicated it was “most probably meant to hit some Russian targets” before it was diverted. Ukraine’s Defence Minister apologised to Estonia and the Baltic partners, describing it as an “unintended incident.” Ukraine’s MFA attributed the diversion to Russian electronic warfare. The Estonian Internal Security Service opened a criminal investigation under a paragraph relating to attacks on air traffic safety. The AeroTime report also confirmed the Latvian Control and Reporting Centre led the intercept operation, coordinating the airspace response across both countries.

Latvia entered 19 May 2026 without a functioning government. On 7 May, two suspected Ukrainian drones entered Latvian airspace, one crashing at a fuel storage facility. Defence Minister Andris Spruds, who had previously declined to criticise Kyiv over drone incursions and insisted Moscow bore responsibility, was forced out by Prime Minister Silina on the grounds that anti-drone systems had not been deployed fast enough. Spruds’ own party, the Progressives, then withdrew from the coalition, stripping Silina of her majority. She resigned on 15 May.

The SVR statement arrives into that gap. Latvia is one of NATO’s highest defence spenders in relative terms at roughly 5% of GDP, a firm supporter of Ukraine through the Drone Coalition it co-leads with the United Kingdom, and a country that has been sending drone systems to Kyiv for years. The suggestion that it is now secretly hosting Ukrainian drone operators for offensive strikes against Russia is the precise inversion of Latvia’s stated and practiced policy. That is the point of the framing: to create political friction inside Latvia at its most vulnerable post-election interregnum moment.

The underlying operational reality is that drones do cross Baltic airspace. They cross because Russia’s electronic warfare systems redirect long-range Ukrainian UAVs off their intended flight paths toward Russia and into the airspace of NATO countries. That is the assessment of Ukrainian, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian officials, confirmed in multiple formal statements. The SVR has chosen to take the symptom (drones in Baltic airspace) and construct an alternative causation (deliberate NATO state sponsorship) that serves a strategic narrative: that Article 5 does not protect states that Russia classifies as supporting Ukrainian terrorism.